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The First “A” in NASA
“To serve the future needs of aviation by conducting research into, and
developing solutions for, the problems of flight, . . . ”
Safe, Efficient Growth in Global Operations
Real-Time System-Wide Safety Assurance
Assured Autonomy for Aviation Transformation
NextGen: Develop and demonstrate future concepts, capabilities, and
technologies to support expected increase in capacity and mobility while
maintaining safety.
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This Talk
How formal methods enable discovery in Air Traffic Management (ATM)
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Air Traffic Management
Three competing objectives:
Performance
Capacity
Safety
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Air Traffic Management in the World
The International Air Transport Association (IATA) predicts that
passenger numbers are expected to reach 7.3 billion by 2034 (4.1%
average annual growth).2
2IATA Press Release No. 57, 16 October 2014.
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Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS)
According to the Association for Unmanned Vehicle Systems International
(AUVSI) the cumulative impact between 2015 and 2025 to the US
economy resulting from the integration of UAS into the NAS will be more
than US $80 billions.3
Agricultural monitoring
Disaster management
News coverage
Environmental monitoring
Freight transport
. . .
3Economic report of AUVSI, March 2013.
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UAS are Here
. . . to stay
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UAS in the National Airspace System (NAS)
A NASA Project
Develop key capabilities to enable routine and safe access for public and
civil use of UAS in non-segregated airspace operations.
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The Main Challenge
Michael Huerta, Administrator, Federal Aviation Administration:4
A bedrock principle of aviation is see and avoid. And if you don’t
have a pilot on board the aircraft, you need something that will
substitute for that, which will sense other aircraft, and we can
ensure appropriate levels of safety.
4http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/
drone-industry-grows-faster-flick-joystick-regulation-lag.
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14CFR Part 91
91.111 (a) No person may operate an aircraft so close to another
aircraft as to create a collision hazard.
91.113 (b) General. When weather conditions permit, regardless of
whether an operation is conducted under instrument flight rules or
visual flight rules, vigilance shall be maintained by each person
operating an aircraft so as to see and avoid other aircraft.
When a rule of this section gives another aircraft the right-of-way, the
pilot shall give way to that aircraft and may not pass over, under,
or ahead of it unless well clear.
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Detect and Avoid
(Formerly Known As Sense and Avoid)
Detect and Avoid (DAA) was defined by the FAA as the combination
of UAS Self-Separation (SS) plus Collision Avoidance (CA) as a
means of compliance with 14CFR Part 91, §91.111 and §91.113.5
DAA Requirements: DAA shall
1 provide a geometric means to determine well-clear status
2 interoperate with existing collision avoidance systems
3 avoid undue concern for traffic aircraft
4 enable self-separation capabilities
5SAA for UAS Workshop Final Report, October 9, 2009.
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Traffic Alert and Collision Avoidance System
(TCAS)
Family of airborne systems designed to reduce the risk of mid-air
collisions between cooperative aircraft (i.e., transponder equipped).
Mandated in the US for aircraft with greater than 30 seats or a
maximum takeoff weight greater than 33,000 pounds.
Current version, TCAS II, provides:
Traffic Alerts (TAs).
(Vertical) Resolution Advisories (RAs).
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TCAS II TA and RA Volumes
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Deconstructing TCAS II RA Detection Logic (I)
Pairwise logic: ownship and intruder aircraft.
TCAS volumes are based on distance and time functions on aircraft
relative states:
Range r and relative altide rz .
Time Tau:
τ ≡ − r
r˙
.
Time to co-altitude (tcoa):
tcoa ≡ − rz
r˙z
.
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Deconstructing TCAS II RA Detection Logic (II)
Times and distance functions are compared against a set of thresholds,
whose values depend on ownship’s altitude:
DMOD, ZTHR: Horizontal and vertical distance thresholds compared to
r and rz , respectively.
TAUMOD: Time threshold compared to τ and tcoa.
TCASII RA ≡ (r ≤ DMOD or (τ ≤ TAUMOD and . . .)) and
(rz ≤ ZTHR or tcoa ≤ TAUMOD).
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The Story of Tau
Tau is an approximation of time to closest point of approach (Tcpa).
Tau is not necessarily a good approximation.
In a non-accelerating encounter, Tcpa decreases linearly with respect
to time.
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Modified Tau
TCAS II Version 7.1., uses Modified Tau:
τmod ≡ − r
2 −DMOD2
r r˙
Modified Tau is a more conservative approximation of Tcpa:
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Time to DMOD
(Also known as Time to Entry Point)
Time to DMOD, i.e., tep,is more conservative than Modified Tau and it
decreases linearly with time for non-accelerating encounter:
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Towards a Geometric Definition of Well-Clear
Global positioning systems enable precise definitions of distance and time
functions.
(so , soz), (vo , voz): Ownship’s position and velocity vectors.
(si , siz), (vi , viz): Intruder’s position and velocity vectors.
s, v: Relative horizontal position and velocity vectors, i.e.,
s = so − si and v = vo − vi .
sz , vz : Relative vertical altitude and speed, i.e.,
sz = soz − siz and vz = voz − viz .
tcpa(s, v) ≡ −s · v
v2
τ(s, v) ≡ − s
2
s · v ,
τmod(s, v) ≡ DMOD
2 − s2
s · v tep(s, v) ≡
−s · v −√∆(s, v)
v2
,
where ∆(s, v) ≡ DMOD2v2 − (s · v⊥)2.
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Three Little Lemmas
For all s, v representing non-accelerating converging encounters predicted
to cross DMOD, i.e., s · v < 0, s2 > DMOD, and ∆(s, v) ≥ 0,
Lemma 1: tep(s, v) ≤ τmod(s, v) ≤ tcpa(s, v) ≤ τ(s, v),
Lemma 2: Let tvar be one of {tep, τmod, tcpa, τ},
tvar(s, v) = tvar(−s,−v).
Lemma 3: Let tvar be one of {tep, τmod, tcpa}, for all
0 ≤ t1 ≤ t2 ≤ tcpa(s, v),
tvar(s + t1v, v) ≥ tvar(s + t2, v)
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A Formal Definition of Well Clear
Requirement 1: WC shall provide a geometric means to determine well-clear status
Let tvar be one of {tep, τmod, tcpa, τ}, two aircraft are in tvar-well-clear
violation if and only if WCVtvar(s, v) holds.
WCVtvar(s, sz , v, vz) ≡ Horizontal WCVtvar(s, v) and
Vertical WCV(sz , vz),
(1)
where
Horizontal WCVtvar(s, v) ≡ ‖s‖ ≤ DMOD or
(dcpa(s, v) ≤ DMOD and 0 ≤ tvar(s, v) ≤ TAUMOD),
dcpa(s, v) ≡ ‖s + tcpa(s, v) v‖,
Vertical WCV(sz , vz) ≡ |sz | ≤ ZTHR or 0 ≤ tcoa(sz , vz) ≤ TCOA,
tcoa(sz , vz) ≡ − sz
vz
.
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A Family of Well-Clear Volumes
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Well-Clear Properties: Inclusion
Requirement 2: WC shall interoperate with existing collision avoidance systems
Theorem 1 (Inclusion)
For all (s, sz), (v, vz),
WCVτ (s, sz , v, vz) =⇒ WCVtcpa(s, sz , v, vz) =⇒ WCVτmod(s, sz , v, vz)
=⇒ WCVtep(s, sz , v, vz).
For an appropriate choice of threshold values, i.e., DMOD, ZTHR, TAUMOD,
and TCOA, the violation volumes determined by WCVτmod(s, sz , v, vz) and
WCVtep(s, sz , v, vz) are larger than the TCAS II RA volume.
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Well-Clear Properties: Symmetry
Requirement 3: WC shall avoid undue concern for traffic aircraft
Theorem 2 (Symmetry)
Let tvar be one of {tep, τmod, tcpa, τ}, for all (s, sz), (v, vz),
WCVtvar(s, sz , v, vz) ⇐⇒ WCVtvar(−s,−sz ,−v,−vz).
In any encounter, the intruder aircraft makes the same determination as
the ownship about the well-clear status.
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Well-Clear Properties: Local Convexity
Requirement 4: WC shall enable self-separation capabilities
Theorem 3 (Local Convexity)
Let tvar be one of {tep, τmod, tcpa}, for all (s, sz), (v, vz), t1 ≤ t2 ≤ t3,
WCVtvar(s + t1v, sz + t1vz , v, vz) and WCVtvar(s + t3v, sz + t3vz , v, vz) =⇒
WCVtvar(s + t2v, sz + t2vz , v, vz).
In a non-accelerating encounter, there is at most one time interval where
the aircraft are in well-clear violation.
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Well-Clear Algorithms: Detection
The following algorithm returns the time interval of tvar-well-clear violation
within a lookahead time T .
detection WCVtvar(s, sz , v, vz ,T ) ≡
let [t1, t2] = detection VWCV(sz , vz ,T ) in
if t1 > t2 then [T , 0]
elsif t1 = t2 and Horizontal WCVtvar(s + t1v, v) then [t1, t1]
elsif t1 = t2 then [T , 0]
else let [tin, tout] = detection HWCVtvar(s + t1v, v, t2 − t1) in
[tin + t1, tout + t1]
endif,
where
detection VWCV(sz , vz ,T ) ≡ . . .
detection HWCVtvar(s + t1v, v, t2 − t1) ≡ . . .
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detection WCVtvar
Theorem 4 (Soundness and Completeness)
Let tvar be one of {tep, τmod, tcpa}, for all (s, sz), (v, vz), T > 0, and
t ∈ [0,T ],
WCVtvar(s + tv, sz + tvz , v, vz) ⇐⇒
t ∈ detection WCVtvar(s, sz , v, vz ,T ).
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Well-Clear Algorithms: Self-Separation Bands
Bands are ranges of track, ground speed, and vertical speed that lead to
well-clear.
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DAIDALUS: Detect and Avoid Alerting Logic for
Unmanned Systems6
Open source implementation in Java and C++ of formally verified
DAA algorithms.
Considered for inclusion as DAA reference implementation in RTCA
Minimum Operational Performance Standards (MOPS) for Unmanned
Aircraft Systems.
6Logo was designed by Mahyar Malekpour (NASA).
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DAIDALUS in Theory
Family of well-clear volumes defined in the Program Verification
System (PVS).
Formally proved in PVS that WC volumes satisfy high-level
requirements: inclusion, symmetry, local convexity.
Formally specified WC algorithms: detection, self-separation bands,
and alerting.
Formally verified correctness of the algorithms against functional
requirements.
PVS Library #Theories #Proofs #Lines of Spec.
ACCoRD 77 1,211 8,601
TCASII 9 142 784
WellClear 19 236 1,244
DAIDALUS 21 385 3,509
Total 126 1,974 14,138
30 / 38
DAIDALUS in PVS
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DAIDALUS in Practice
Code released under NASA
Open Source Agreement:
Java: 34,371 (loc).
C++: 40,445 (loc).
DAIDALUS is currently
being used in
human-in-the-loop
experiments independently
conducted at NASA and
FAA.
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DAIDALUS Verification and Validation
(On going work)
Results: 
Model Validation / 
Implementation Verification
DAA Functional 
Requirements
Algorithms
Safety 
Properties
Algorithms
Comparison
Test Cases
Formal Model
Implementation
Translation 
by Hand
Model 
Animation
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Formal Methods in Air Traffic Management
Technical Challenges
Most modern verification systems have limited support for continuous
mathematics.
Algorithms are long, statements are longer, and proofs are even
longer.
Developed PVS decision and semi-decision procedures based on
interval arithmetic, affine arithmetic, Bernstein polynomials, Sturm
and Tarski theorems. More are needed.
The elephant in the room: floating point numbers.
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Formal Proofs in the Real Field
[-1] eps = 1 OR eps = -1
[-2] v‘y*eps <= 0
[-3] rd‘y*eps < 0
[-4] ((v‘x = 0 AND v‘y = 0) IMPLIES rd‘x >= 0)
[-5] ((v‘x /= 0 OR v‘y /= 0) IMPLIES rd‘x > v‘x)
[-6] rd‘x*v‘y*eps-rd‘y*v‘x*eps <= 0
[-7] mps‘y*eps+rd‘y*eps < 0
[-8] v‘x >= 0
[-9] (dv‘x /= 0 OR dv‘y /= 0)
[-10] mps‘x*rd‘y*eps-mps‘y*rd‘x*eps <= 0
[-11] -1*(dv‘x*mps‘y*eps)-dv‘x*rd‘y*eps+ dv‘y*mps‘x*eps+dv‘y*rd‘x*eps < 0
[-12] ((rd‘x*mps‘x+rd‘x*rd‘x+rd‘y*mps‘y+rd‘y*rd‘y < 0 AND
dv‘x*rd‘y*eps-dv‘y*rd‘x*eps < 0) OR (rd‘x*mps‘x+rd‘x*rd‘x+
rd‘y*mps‘y+rd‘y*rd‘y >= 0 AND dv‘x*mps‘x+dv‘x*rd‘x+dv‘y*mps‘y+
dv‘y*rd‘y > rd‘x*mps‘x+rd‘x*rd‘x+rd‘y*mps‘y+rd‘y*rd‘y
AND dv‘x*rd‘y*eps-dv‘y*rd‘x*eps <= 0))
|-------
[1] (dv‘x /= 0 OR dv‘y /= 0) AND dv‘y*eps < 0 AND ((v‘x = 0 AND v‘y = 0)
IMPLIES dv‘x >= 0) AND ((v‘x /= 0 OR v‘y /= 0) IMPLIES dv‘x > v‘x)
AND dv‘x*v‘y*eps-dv‘y*v‘x*eps <= 0
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Formal Methods in Air Traffic Management
Practical Challenges
ATM is a non-traditional formal methods domain:
ATMer: Formal what? – FMist: Air Traffic what?
ATM is more than software and avionics systems.
ATM is a real globally distributed system.
Revolutionary approaches vs. Evolutionary approaches.
Theoretical solutions vs. Practical solutions.
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To Bring Home
As for the future, your task is not to foresee it, but to enable it.
Antoine de Saint-Exupery (1900-1944)
Formal methods are enabling the worldwide evolution of the Next
Generation of Air Traffic Systems.
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